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ASSOCIATED PRESS WAR CORRESPONDENT Edward Kennedy (1905–1963) was
among the 17 journalists chosen to witness Germany’s surrender, ending Allied
combat operations in Europe during World War II (Knightley, 2002). While en route
to the early morning meeting, all members of the press corps were warned that the
story was under embargo until Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (or
SHAEF) issued its official release. After the event, the armed services placed a 36-
hour embargo on the story; when Edward Kennedy broke that embargo, he told the
world that the war with Germany was over – and paid dearly for his actions. In the
weeks and months following his news scoop, Kennedy had his press credentials
pulled, and the Associated Press began pressuring him to resign. When he did so, his
career disintegrated and his life unraveled. In 1963, as he walked home from work,
he was mowed down by a young driver in California (Kennedy, 2012). In May 2012,
after nearly seven decades, the Associated Press finally issued an apology to Edward
Kennedy and his family; and while the family may welcome this exoneration, the
ethical implications of his story and the relationship war correspondents (both pres-
ent and past) share with the US military continue to bear review.
While the craft of journalism has been around for more than four centuries, the
process of war reporting remains an ill-defined aspect of the field. Yes, there have been
reporters covering wars for many years, but in an age of modern warfare there really
isn’t a single or coherent definition of, or prescription for, how the war journalist goes
about covering conflict. This is due, chiefly, to the sporadic nature of military conflict:
during times of peace, the institutional knowledge of the war correspondent fades,
while military officials continue to develop newer and more sophisticated methods
designed to distract, deter and define the role of the reporter at war. 
In the US wars of this century, war correspondents were issued wireless digital
equipment and ‘embedded’ with field troops as they moved through the war theater, and
the resulting news coverage was astounding. During the opening days of the US invasion
of Iraq, war reporters would send live video news accounts from the field via satellite
link-up to their host television news organizations. In most cases, the images were blurry
and pixelated but the audio was relatively strong and the reporting was (typically)
breathless, but sent in ‘real time’. To the viewer, these reports offered an instantaneous
look inside the world of the combat soldier. Unfortunately, absent any depth or analysis,
the stories were often two-dimensional accounts of roadside encounters leading to the
Iraqi capital, Baghdad. Missing from these live events was a sense of perspective detailing
casualty numbers or any measure of success of the overall advance. 
Without perspective, these field reports failed to reveal relevant information;
instead, viewers saw patriotic missives from war correspondents and their US mili-
tary field units as they raced to convergence in Baghdad. The George W. Bush
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administration and the Pentagon were thrilled with the overall success of the media
campaign: Baghdad had fallen in weeks and the whole thing was broadcast live and
without substantive challenge (Linder, 2008). 
If you tear back the veneer of digital news tools, the coverage of the US War on
Terror was not very different from the way many other US conflicts were covered.
The US military controlled the news in a way that encouraged a positive pro-
American interpretation of the action as US forces moved across Iraq. The Pentagon
did this by ‘enlisting’ the media (Tumber, 2004) and attaching them to military units
where each correspondent was sheltered, clothed, fed, transported and protected.
That way, the media were controlled, tempered and regulated and the news reflected
that (Linder, 2008). That model found sweeping success during World War II, was
lost during the less-popular Korean and Vietnam wars, but was reconstituted in time
for the most recent US conflicts. 
If we understand independence and impartiality to be central values of journal-
ism, it’s clear war correspondents are losing to a military that may have finally per-
fected its approach to news management, control and censorship. However, history
teaches us that even when some aspect of war reporting is controlled by the US mil-
itary, the war correspondent can still exercise some independence. Unfortunately for
him, this is exactly what Ed Kennedy (1948) did – he rejected the military’s control
over his craft – and he did so at a time when, as today, it was unconventional; in
addition to the US military’s retribution, many of his peers scorned him, and he was
soundly punished for his actions. 
This essay will first explore the history of the war correspondent, particularly in
World War II, and then examine Edward Kennedy’s role in breaking the story of the
end of the war in Europe to the American people. Then, the essay analyses the
implications of Kennedy’s story. Finally, it ends with a modest suggestion that could
help shape the future of reporting during conflict.
History of War Correspondency
Most journalism historians believe that reporter William Howard Russell (Knightley,
2002) served as the first modern war correspondent when The Times of London dis-
patched him to cover the Crimean War in 1854. During his 22 months in the field,
Russell suffered a contentious relationship with the British military. He was treated
with contempt; he was forced to procure his own rations, housing, clothing and
transportation; he was denied access to military personnel; when he reported some-
thing negatively, he had his patriotism challenged repeatedly; and he was censored
both in the field and at home. Overall, Russell’s experience was a snapshot of the
challenges that awaited his followers as they covered the conflicts. 
By 1920, the duties of the war correspondent were still very much undefined.
Even though most of the Western world was drawn into the First World War, few
journalism protocols were established simply because censorship was so severe. In
peacetime, however, journalism had developed an ethos. There were rules for the
modern journalist. It was the responsibility of the news writer to be independent,
agnostic and free thinking; one was not allowed to write with patriotic flair; reports
had to be true accounts of actual events; and the journalist had to work without any
prejudices. Proof of these canons found their way into American press organizations
and, in 1922, the American Society of News Editors published its ‘State of Prin -
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ciples’, for all news producers. These called for, among other things, accountability;
independence; truth and accuracy; responsibility; impartiality; and fair play. 
By the mid-1920s, this list of modern tenets of honest news reporting had been
established. And because the war correspondent is a subset of the news community,
one needn’t make too much of a leap in logic to assume that these same rules should
apply to journalists reporting on war. 
Nonetheless, the business of the war correspondent is also a special case: cover-
ing the news and speaking truth to power can be tricky enough responsibilities; but
when you consider that a careless news reporter can also be killed for his/her actions,
the prospect of newsgathering in a war theatre can be downright intimidating. 
This element of heightened mortality also creates a tricky relationship between
war correspondents and the military operations they’re assigned to cover (Tumber,
2004): On one hand, the journalist must remain objective; on the other, he/she must
depend upon the military for protection, and often now food, clothing, transporta-
tion and shelter. Given the closeness of this contact, it is easy to understand how
even the most serious reporter can lose sight of objectivity while moving through a
battlefield under the careful protection of the military (Lindner, 2008). 
Then there is the issue of national security. Since the American Civil War mili-
tary leaders have laboured to find a way to work with war correspondents (Knightley,
2002: 19). Questions still remain over how much information should be reported
about troop movements, sanitary conditions, new technologies, fatalities, failed and
failing campaigns, atrocities and so forth. So far, there has been no wartime model
for evenhandedness. Too much information can be caustic to the war effort; too little
and a veneer of propaganda taints the accuracy of the reporting of events.
In fact, during the last century and a half, there have been many approaches to
censorship and how wars are covered. By the end of World War I, the US military
had cultivated a culture of censorship (Knightley, 2002) that all but extinguished any
actual news from emerging from the European war front, through the supply lines,
to the readers in the United States. An uneasy detente had been formed and the
news corps, post World War I, often found themselves to be impotent and inert. In
times of war, the modern war correspondent had to contend with access issues, mud-
dled and distorted military reportage, and outright censorship. 
In addition to these barriers, war correspondents must also deal with the pres-
sures placed upon them by their colleagues, editors, employers, professional peers,
and the public at large. Throughout the US involvement in World War II, pressures
were in place that ensured most of the war reportage written by US war correspon-
dents supported the US ‘war effort’. During the four-year conflict, it was rare that
a war correspondent would write anything critical of the US armed services. There
were two factors that may have caused journalists to act accordingly: first, the US
censors culled stories so vigorously, it was unlikely anything but positive news was
going to slip through their network; second, but no less important, was a culture of
self-editing (Tumber, 2004). In either case, one or several of the principles outlined
by the ASNE were violated and, for that reason, American readers suffered. 
War Reportage During World War II
When the United States finally entered World War II (Knightley, 2002), many
American news reporters considered abandoning their news careers and enlisting in the
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armed services. Journalists such as Ernest Hemingway saw their service as war
correspondents as a way to contribute to the US war effort. When they arrived in the
European theatre of operation, the Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force
(or SHAEF) was more than willing to oblige such ambitions. War correspondents were
seen as ‘unofficial’ extensions of the military staff (Lewis, 1981). Journalists were
granted non-commissioned officer status, were issued uniforms and military credentials,
assigned desks, equipment, drivers and staff. In exchange, the war correspondent had
to sign a contract assuring that all news stories would be reviewed by military censors
before transmission. And, because the military controlled most of the transmission
lines, a ‘censorship at the source’ culture had been perfected. 
Oddly, some war correspondents saw this system as beneficial to their relation-
ships with the military. They came to believe that because of the censorship, soldiers
and commanders were able to speak more freely, on the understanding that the cen-
sors would prevent important and sensitive military information from reaching the
public (Knightley, 2002). By 1944, the allied public relations apparatus had been
established in Paris with a staff equipped to manage over 1,000 war correspondents
and three million words of news copy generated each week. General Dwight D.
Eisenhower famously noted: ‘public opinion wins war’. Eisenhower’s belief illustrates
why big military operations including D-Day and the Italian campaign included, in
their planning, strategies for how journalists would report these events. 
Odder still was the behavior of the war correspondents in the field: it was not
uncommon for these ‘noncombatant’ journalists to carry sidearms (Knightley, 2002).
In some cases, field reporters took actions to aid wounded soldiers and took arms to
fight the enemy. 
Clearly, the lines delineating the reporter and soldier were blurred; and, as a
result, much of the news copy produced by the World War II American press corps
was strongly patriotic, filled with bluster and romance and devoid of any information
that illustrated weakness in the Allied command and its performance in the European
theatre. 
This was the culture in place in spring 1945. 
VE Day
When Associated Press war correspondent Edward Kennedy arrived in Reims,
France, on the morning of May 7, 1945, he knew he was about to witness an impor-
tant piece of history. For weeks now, the remnants of Germany’s Third Reich were
in fast decline. Adolf Hitler was dead; British and American forces were halted at the
Elbe River as the Russian Army marched on Berlin. Rumours of surrender had cir-
culated throughout Paris and Europe, but so far nothing conclusive had been signed.
When General Frank Allen Jr., the public relations administrator for SHAEF,
contacted the Associated Press’s Paris Bureau, Kennedy, the bureau chief, decided
he would be the one to go to Reims (Lewis, 1981). The short list of invited journal-
ists included representatives of the broadcast media, US army publications and
British, Canadian and Australian news agencies. It also included Kennedy’s two top
rivals: James Kilgallen from the International News Agency and Boyd Lewis from
the United Press. 
By that point in the war with Germany, General Eisenhower had moved the
Supreme Headquarters for the SHAEF to France. The Public Relations Division,
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which was managed by General Allen (Kennedy, 2012), was located inside the Scribe
Hotel in Paris and most of the war correspondents attached to the SHAEF had
either taken up residence inside the hotel or very nearby.
As part of the press relations matrix created during World War II (Lewis, 1981),
each war correspondent was inducted into the armed services and was assigned an
honorary rank and wore the appropriate uniform; when it came time to file stories,
the US Army Signal Corps controlled the telegraph operations and all communica-
tions going into and out of the war theatre had to be authorized by the military. In
Paris, each wire correspondent needed to reserve time with the Signal Corps, which
worked on a first-come-first-served basis. These factors would weigh heavily in
Kennedy’s decision when the time came to publish the story.
At the heart of the controversy to come was a pledge each of the war correspon-
dents took when they were assigned their press credentials. Historically, all World
War II war correspondents had to accept oversight from SHAEF as part of their
relationship. As the group of 17 war correspondents travelled to Reims to witness
Germany surrender, General Allen reminded the newsmen of that pledge, telling
them that the story was under embargo and that nothing could be released until
SHAEF gave its authorization. At that time, however, no one knew how long that
embargo was going to last (Kennedy, 2012).
According to Boyd Lewis (1981), from the United Press, General Allen said:
‘This group has been chosen to represent the press of the world. The story is off the
record until the respective heads of the Allied governments announce the fact to the
world. I therefore pledge each and every one of you on your honor as assimilated
officers of the US Army and as members of the press, not to communicate the
results of this conference or even the fact of its existence, until released by the
SHAEF.’ Lewis remembered that Kennedy along with all the rest of the correspon-
dents nodded in agreement.
But Kennedy (1948) had another impression: ‘As the airplane winged northeast-
ward, Allen told us that the trip concerned the impending surrender of the Germans.
Then followed the “pledge on the plane”, so much cited in the controversy, which
followed. Allen and some of the correspondents later vested this with the solemnity
of an initiation in one of the more mystically inclined fraternal orders. In reality it
was a rambling talk by the general.’
The Surrender
The German surrender ceremony took place inside a local schoolhouse, the École
Polytechnique of Reims, at 2:41a.m., Monday, May 7, 1945 (Lewis, 1981). In a
crowded classroom, with the correspondents lined along the wall and jammed in the
doorway, General Alfred Josef Jodl, the new chief of staff of the German Army,
entered and scrawled his name below the articles of surrender.
When he was finished, Jodl said: ‘General, with this signature the German people
and the German armed forces, are, for the better or worse, delivered into the victor’s
hands.’
The whole event took 20 minutes (Lewis, 1981).
From there, the correspondents were taken to a conference room to write their
stories. Several hours went by and then General Allen entered the room and told
them that the story was under embargo until 3p.m., local time, Tuesday, May 8,
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1945; 36 hours after the surrender (Lewis, 1981). At the time, the entire press corps
objected: they believed that the story – given its importance – would certainly leak
and that one of the war correspondents in Paris would publish a piece. General Allen
said that he sympathised and that he shared their concerns with General Eisenhower,
but the embargo was pending official comments from President Harry Truman,
Prime Minister Winston Churchill and Soviet leader Joseph Stalin.
The Race
When the time came to leave, all 17 war correspondents were scheduled to fly back
to Paris together. Because the US Army Signal Corps controlled the telegraph lines,
Boyd Lewis from the UP knew that he had to beat the others to the Scribe Hotel
and to the Single Corps office to register his story. Lewis, given some time to think,
calculated that if he were the first one to board the truck leaving for the airfield in
Reims, he’d be the last one to board the plane to Paris, and thus, would be the first
one off the plane. He also arranged to have a car waiting for him at the Paris airfield.
His planned worked perfectly. (Scully, 1995)
James Kilgallen and Edward Kennedy, meanwhile shared a ride across Paris
(Lewis, 1981).
Lewis was the first to arrive and when Lewis got to the Signal Corps office, he
dropped his 5,000-word story before the signal corpsman, who stamped the article
first for transmission. Behind Lewis, Kilgallen and Kennedy realised the significance
of the registration and raced each other into and through the hotel; Kilgallen beat
Kennedy to the Scribe’s revolving door and, as the two raced side-by-side up the
stairs, Kilgallen ‘accidentally’ dropped his portable typewriter at Kennedy’s feet trip-
ping him up. Kilgallen registered second; Kennedy registered third (Scully, 1995).
This process of registration was created by the US military to control telephony and
telegraphy access to the United States. As war correspondents working out of Paris, each
journalist had to book time with the Signal Corps (Lewis, 1981). Since Lewis was the
first to arrive in the Signal Corps office, his was the first article in line for transmission.
So, all Lewis had to do was wait for the embargo to lift and the scoop was his.
The 36-Hour Repose
Back inside his hotel room, Kennedy (1948) began weighing his options. News of the
surrender was already leaking out. At 10a.m., that same morning, the army hosted a
news conference and invited many of the war correspondents attached to the Scribe
Hotel offices. Again, the army reaffirmed its 36-hour embargo and again many of the
correspondents denounced the decision.
Since 1941, Kennedy had found himself cornered by the censors as he weighed
the news value of at least three very important news events. In one case, the censors
asked that he not publish a now-notorious story about General George Patton slap-
ping an enlisted man during a hospital inspection. Allied commander General
Dwight Eisenhower appealed directly to Kennedy not to publish the story and
Kennedy complied only to see the story broken by Drew Pearson, another war cor-
respondent (Knightley, 2002). Now, Kennedy was standing by waiting for another
imaginary barrier to be lifted so he could publish. The conflict bothered him.
Inside the Associated Press newsroom, Kennedy (1948) began reading dispatches:
French General Charles De Gaulle was preparing his VE Day address; and General
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Francois Sevez who signed the Instruments of Surrender for France had sent his
eyewitness account to the newspaper Figaro. The Paris afternoon newspapers were
reporting that loud speakers were being erected at 10 Downing Street in London ahead
of a formal announcement from Prime Minister Winston Churchill. Finally, at 2:03p.m.,
Lutz Graf Schwerin von Krosigk, the leader of what remained of Germany’s Third
Reich, announced the unconditional surrender in a broadcast over German radio.
The news was breaking.
Kennedy attempted to reach General Allen who was too busy to take his call
(Kennedy, 1948). Ever persistent, Kennedy approached Lt. Col. Richard Merrick,
the chief American censor, and showed him the text of the German surrender mes-
sage. Merrick refused to yield.
Stating that the Allies had effectively ‘released the news’ through the Germans,
Kennedy challenged Merrick: ‘I give you warning now that I am going to send the
story,’ he said (Knightley, 2002). Kennedy (1948) wrote that Merrick answered,
saying: ‘Do as you please.’
Kennedy then returned to his hotel room.
Odd as it seems, despite the Allies’ nearly airtight security system, a communica-
tions loophole existed: at a French-run military airbase on the edge of Paris, it was
possible to get brief uncensored messages into London. Boyd Lewis (1981) said cor-
respondents used the line primarily to contact wives and girlfriends in England.
From inside the hotel, Kennedy (1948) called the Paris military switchboard on
the airbase, which routed his call to London and unknowingly to the Associated
Press bureau there. Once connected, Kennedy began dictating his news story. He got
300 words out before the phone went dead (Knightley, 2002). Still, it was enough for
the London office to move forward: it finished writing the bulletin and sent it along
to New York (Kennedy, 1948; Lewis, 1981).
The Scoop
When the story arrived in the Associated Press headquarters in New York City, edi-
tors there stalled. They’d been burned just 10 days earlier with the same news and
they wanted a moment to consider the facts (Knightley, 2002). It was 9:30a.m. in
New York and the Associated Press stood poised to send the story out as a bulletin
to all 2,500 clients, a list that included most major American dailies. The debate
lasted just eight minutes (Kennedy, 1948); then they posted Ed Kennedy’s story.
It read in part:
REIMS, France, May 7 – Germany surrendered unconditionally to the
Western Allies and the Soviet Union at 2:41 A.M. French time today.
The surrender took place at a little red schoolhouse that is the headquar-
ters of Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower.
The surrender, which brought the war in Europe to a formal end after five
years, eight months and six days of bloodshed and destruction, was signed for
Germany by Col. Gen. Gustav Jodl. General Jodl is the new Chief of Staff of
the German Army.
The war in Europe was over. On the morning of May 8, 1945, most newspapers
across the United States published Ed Kennedy’s story just below their banners. In
most cases, the story included Kennedy’s byline. 
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But on May 7, 1945, as the story was spreading through the AP network, the
Paris correspondents began receiving queries from their own news agencies. One
message sent by the United Press to Boyd Lewis (1981) read:
ROXX (U.P. code for A.P.) LITTLE RED SCHOOLHOUSE REIMS
GERMANY SURRENDERS STOP HOW QUERY.
It was apparent to Lewis and the other correspondents that the story had reached the
United States and the United Press was asking Lewis how the Paris bureau had
missed the story. Because of the embargo, Lewis couldn’t reply to the cable, and
after repeated pleas by Lewis to the army to release the story, Allied Command kept
the embargo in place. Lewis (1981) was forced to wait another 24 hours, a fact that
infuriated him: he wasn’t the only one. 
Reporters throughout the Scribe Hotel began clustering to share their knowledge
over how the story was reported and subsequently released (Kennedy, 2012). The
debate included questions about Kennedy’s ethics and actions.
‘You realize, gentlemen, that you have taken the worst beating of your lives,’ said
Drew Middleton, the New York Times correspondent (Knightley, 2002). ‘The ques-
tion is, what are you going to do about it?’ 
Within hours, a petition had been drafted and signed by 54 of the war corre-
spondents attached to SHAEF in Paris. In it, they angrily denounced Ed Kennedy’s
decision to break the embargo and called Kennedy’s ethics into question. That peti-
tion included language labeling Kennedy’s actions as ‘the most disgraceful, deliber-
ate and unethical double cross in the history of journalism’ (Knightley, 2002). 
Some days later, Middleton cabled home that the SHAEF news embargo was ‘the
most colossal “snafu” in the history of the war. I am browned off, fed up, burned up
and put out.’
The Fallout
Allied Command took swift action. They immediately pulled Ed Kennedy’s press
credentials (Kennedy, 1948). SHAEF also suspended press credentials for the entire
Associated Press throughout Europe; that suspension was eventually lifted after offi-
cials in Washington admonished the decision.
At first, the Associated Press was calling Kennedy’s story ‘the scoop of the cen-
tury’ and they championed his resourcefulness (Scully, 1995). And then, Associated
Press member organisations, led aggressively by the New York Times, began calling
for action. Within days, AP president Robert McLean issued an apology (Kennedy,
2012): ‘The Associated Press profoundly regrets … [Kennedy’s filing the story] in
advance of authorization by Supreme Allied Headquarters.’ 
Upon reading McLean’s statement, Kennedy (2012) deemed it a ‘serious blow’ to
his credibility and decided to return to the United States.
When Kennedy arrived in New York, he attempted to quit but AP executive
director Kent Cooper refused to accept his resignation (Kennedy, 1948). Kennedy
was asked to issue an apology but he refused; finally, Kennedy was tendered ‘an
attractive job offer elsewhere’, but declined, believing the job was little more than ‘a
convenient way out’ for both himself and the Associated Press (Kennedy, 1948).
For the next 18 months, the ethical questions played out in the editorial pages of
several newspapers. The Richmond Times-Dispatch deemed Kennedy an unethical
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despot and demanded his expulsion from the industry; the Cincinnati Times-Star
argued that SHAEF’s embargo was foolish and supported Kennedy, stating his
actions were rash but were in the best interest of readers.
The newspaper industry’s leading trade journal, Editor & Publisher, also took a
stand. It declared that Kennedy’s explanation of his actions was insufficient and that
he failed to follow one of the key tenets of journalism: he violated the confidence of
a trusted source.
As for Kennedy himself, he stayed with the Associated Press until 1946. It’s
unclear how he was treated in the newsroom and it’s unclear if he was fired or if he
quit. Instead, a lump sum of $4,986.80 mysteriously appeared in his bank account in
the Summer of 1946 (Kennedy, 1948); and soon after he received a formal letter
explaining that the money was part of a settlement of accounts ‘in connection with
your resignation.’
The Aftermath
In the months and years that followed, it appeared to Kennedy that just about every-
one had an opinion of his actions. He believed that while many of his peers in the
industry were disappointed with his decision (Kennedy, 1948), many in the public
felt he was justified and that they had a right to know the outcome of the brutal war
as soon as it had concluded.
In 1947, General Eisenhower restored Kennedy’s credentials as a war correspon-
dent and issued a statement: ‘In my own heart, after reflection and after the war, I
find only room to believe that the error was committed in an excess of zeal.’
Kennedy (1948) found the gesture to be symbolic and of little value since the war
was over.
In August 1948, Kennedy published an article entitled ‘I’d Do It Again’ in The
Atlantic magazine, where he detailed his decision to move forward with the story; he
also reviewed the actions of his peers in the press corps., the Allied Command, the
Associated Press and others. He never admitted any wrongdoing and never offered
any apology for the work.
In the years afterward, Kennedy never came to terms with his standing in the
news industry. He divorced, had a history of heavy drinking and subsequently lost
his driver’s license (Scully, 2007). He also moved across the country to California to
work for The Santa Barbara Press and The Monterey Peninsula Herald. In November,
1963, as he walked home late one evening, he was struck and killed by an automo-
bile. He was 58.
Analysis
It’s clear by Kennedy’s story that the VE Day event ruined his career. What’s not
clear is who was responsible. It appears that Kennedy felt martyred by the event and
his stubbornness certainly worked against him (Kennedy, 1948). But it also appears
that the Associated Press turned its back on him and let him take the balance of the
blame alone (Kennedy, 2012). 
Kennedy spent several years pressuring the government to explain the chain of
events surrounding the VE Day surrender announcement. That query ended when
the government admitted that General Eisenhower had authorized German authori-
ties to issue the surrender news over the radio network. To Kennedy (1948), that was
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vindication: he had not violated their embargo because the news had already been
issued publicly.
Kennedy further believed that the Allied Forces were foolish to stall the story.
He determined that British and American leaders issued the embargo to allow the
Soviet Union time to create its own surrender ceremony in Berlin; that event hap-
pened some days later and became a pawn in the looming Cold War political
exchange. Kennedy (2012) also believed that delaying the news endangered Allied
servicemen simply because it extended German resistance as these forces moved
through the European theater.
One could also argue that Kennedy was merely using these excuses to justify his
own vanity and that he was simply acting out to justify his competitive nature and
subsequent desire to ‘scoop’ the United Press and the International News Service
(Lewis, 1981).
Regardless of his motivations, Kennedy still suffered and he suffered on many
levels and it could be argued that wartime journalism suffered as well.
When the SHAEF suspended press credentials for all the Associated Press
correspondents serving in Europe, it sent a very potent message to the AP executives in
New York about access to information (Tumber, 2004). At that point in history, the AP
was still battling the United Press and, to a lesser degree, the International News
Service for control of the wire-media market. Shutting down the AP in Europe certainly
gave the other wire agencies control of the information in that theater and foreshadowed
the possibility of the AP losing access to the Pacific Theater, which was still very active.
It’s not clear what deals, if any, were made between the AP management and the
US government but the AP press access was quickly restored and an apology
denouncing Kennedy’s actions was given by AP President Robert McLean.
While the government took no criminal action against Kennedy, he had certainly
become a pariah among his peers in the industry. A writer at Newsweek called him
‘probably the worst-belabored reporter in the records of modern newspapering. This,
after he served 20 years as a news reporter covering, in addition to everything else,
the Spanish Civil war and the Allied advance through North Africa, Sicily and Italy
during World War II.
Some decades later, Phillip Knightley (2002) published a book entitled ‘The First
Casualty of War’, which accused the World War II war correspondents of cheer-
leading. Veteran journalist Charles Lynch is quoted in Knightley’s book saying:
It’s humiliating to look back at what we wrote during the war. It was crap –
and I don’t exclude the Ernie Pyles or the Alan Mooreheads. We were a prop-
aganda arm of our governments. At the start the censors enforced that, but by
the end we were our own censors. We were cheerleaders. I suppose there
wasn’t an alternative at the time. It was total war. But, for God’s sake, let’s
not glorify our role. It wasn’t good journalism. It wasn’t journalism at all.
And what has happened since then has certainly compounded that observation.
During the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, the embedded journalists assigned to the
US combat units began parroting the kind of war reporting that occurred during
World War II, which is to say, the Iraq War correspondents appeared more like
cheerleaders than journalists (Lindner, 2008).
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In 1945, when the Editor & Publisher published its critique of Kennedy’s work,
it cited that he failed to follow one of the primary tenets of journalism: specifically,
reporters need to treat their sources fairly. Breaking the embargo, the E&P argued,
was tantamount to betraying SHAEF’s confidence.
But there are other tenets a journalist must observe: Among them, timeliness, a
respect for accuracy and a dedication to the readership. Given the enormity of the
event – a virtual end to Allied combat operations in Europe – Kennedy and his peers
had a responsibility to deliver that information in a timely fashion. Kennedy certainly
parted company with his peers when he stepped outside the embargo and filed the
news to London.
And the Associated Press does have a code of conduct dating back to 1914, which
appears on its website and includes the words from Melvin Stone, the AP’s former
general manager:
‘I have no thought of saying The Associated Press is perfect. The frailties of
human nature attach to it,’ wrote Melvin Stone. ‘[But] the thing it is striving
for is a truthful, unbiased report of the world’s happenings … ethical in the
highest degree.’ 
But one could also argue that Kennedy’s action was more attuned to the tone of
enterprise journalism, or news reporting that challenged military authority, created
by the war correspondents working – decades later – during the Vietnam era.
During that war, the many of the top war reporters acted independently of the
US military and often challenged the facts being presented by the military and its
advisors. To them, journalists must battle the government’s resistance, and instead
respect and serve the readers’ needs; the question now is whether that ethical stan-
dard is paramount above all others. 
The Associated Press Apology
In the opening pages of Kennedy’s newly published autobiography: Ed Kennedy’s
War: V-E Day, Censorship & the Associated Press, the outgoing president of the cur-
rent Associated Press issued a posthumous apology to Ed Kennedy. It reads, in part: 
Perhaps in some small way we bring posthumous recognition to an American
hero and embrace – too belatedly – what McLean and Cooper and the AP
board could not admit. Edward Kennedy was the embodiment of the highest
aspirations of the Associated Press and American journalism. 
As I’ve written before, I believe that Kennedy’s reputation was absolutely destroyed
by his peers in the international press core and his host news agency, the Associated
Press. And while this apology certainly vindicates his actions 75 years ago, it certainly
does little to set the stage for how future war correspondents – inside and outside the
AP – should conduct themselves. This, I believe, is a missed opportunity for the AP
and the modern press. 
The Bigger Picture
It’s apparent in the Kennedy case that his cruelest criticisms actually came from his
peers in the news industry. Kennedy was subject to widespread ridicule for violating
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story protocols created by the US military during a conflict that was popular among
US citizens. Because of that popularity, Kennedy and many of his peers in the press
surrendered their objectivity and did so without regard for the long term implications
of that action. 
Clearly, what is lacking – even now, 75 years later – is a list of standards for jour-
nalists working under the duress of war reporting. One could argue that the standard
tenets created by the Society of Professional Journalists and other, companion soci-
eties, could serve this purpose; but I disagree. The dynamic of war reporting is much
different than peacetime work conducted inside the United States, Europe and else-
where. War correspondents are subject to constant oversight by military officials;
these reporters are also ‘guests’ under the care and protection of the military units to
which they are assigned. This symbiotic dynamic must be a factor in the care and
quality of the work created by the War Correspondent; and, as such, must be con-
sidered when drafting ethical guidelines for reporters assigned to combat units. 
Absent these guidelines, chances are – with the next military action – there will
be journalists who passively (or actively) support combat forces and, chances are,
there will be journalists – like Ed Kennedy – who will deviate from the accepted
norms created by the active press corps. 
In an effort to stave off an incident like Kennedy’s, the news community should
establish hard and fast standards for ethical practice by War Correspondents. 
On that point, I’d like to submit that now – as Americans live within the shad-
ows of the War on Terror – is the perfect time for a caucus of War Correspondent
‘veterans’ to meet and evaluate their field experiences; from there, this group should
draft a list of ethical standards and practices, which should be presented to the
Associated Press, the Society of Professional Journalists, and any other societies
engaged in newsgathering practices. Acting now, will help the next generation of war
correspondents perform in possible next and succeeding military engagements.
Finally, a practical guide for ethics will prevent another journalist from being pro-
fessionally and personally savaged as illustrated by the life of Ed Kennedy
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